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Abstract 
Decision theory has made many additions in the field of risk-behavior. For this paper, 
we will specifically look at risk-seeking under time pressure, when the information 
aspect is varied. Subjects took part in a time-constrained in-class experiment to find 
out if increasing the information amount related to a risky decision (gamble), would 
increase their risk-seeking behavior. The time aspect was fixed for all subjects, but 
the information varied. Participants were also asked to report their perceived stress 
level and to fill in a select few questions from the DOSPERT-scale to assess their 
over-all risk behavior. No effect could be found in the risk behavior of participants 
when the information load was increased. Subjects tended to choose the highest 
paying gamble in both the treatment and control group, which does not support our 
hypothesis. Nor could any reported increase in stress from the increased information 
amount load be observed. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Decisions are a part of people's daily routine. Some may be what to eat for lunch or whether to 
buy that fancy shirt from the store earlier. Some decisions are quite arbitrary, but on occasion, 
people are faced with more difficult decisions that may impose some risk to our self or our 
surroundings. Much research has been done in the field of decision-making, both in general 
form and in a risky setting. Classic theories such as ‘Prospect Theory’ by Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979) details people’s inability to always think rationally when faced with risky 
decisions as well as over or undervalue certain risks. Further research has been done by 
Kahneman (2003) outlining people’s rational and intuitive behavior when faced with different 
kinds of decisions. To quote Kahneman (2003), “For example, it is more natural to join a group 
of strangers running in a particular direction than to adopt a contrarian destination”. Intuition 
tells us to follow the stream. What they are running from is uncertain and can be dangerous. 
Decision-making theory even goes as far back as Neoclassical Economic theory, with 
“Expected Utility Theory” regarding our rational behavior when making decisions (Perloff, 
2014). In addition, the technological advancement in recent decennials has enabled investors to 
handle greater amounts of information in the decision-making process (Merton, 1995). 
Computers have even begun crowding out the “real” traders who cannot keep up with the 
millisecond latencies that computers can provide (Nursimulu et al., 2012). Access to advanced 
trading terminals is paramount to handle the large information loads and keep up as trading 
speeds increase (Pappalardo, 2011). Furthermore, the globalization and technological 
advancements of the financial markets permit investors to trade at higher frequencies, 
demanding decisions to be made faster (Hammer, 2013). 
Recent research has proven that in certain cases, a time constraint when making decisions 
can cause subjects to reverse their preferences (Saqib and Chan, 2015). The research showed 
that people tend to be more risk-seeking over gains and more risk-averse over losses under time 
pressure as opposed to the reversed preferences when not under time pressure. However, 
contrary research has shown that the opposite can be true; that subjects seek safer options when 
the time pressure increases, as shown by Hasida and Shlomo (1981), subjects tend to lean 
towards safer options when put under stricter time constraints versus more loose constraints. 
Time constraints can even in some instances have very positive effects. For instance, in the 
world of sports ‘everything’ is done under a time constraint. It is part of what makes it enjoyable 
and competitive (Freedman and Edwards, 1988), participants are pushed to make split-second 
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decisions to outperform their opponents. In addition, studies in decision-making have also 
looked at more biological aspects (Platt and Heuttel, 2008). By looking at the neurological 
effects of decision-making, they found that specific parts of the brain operate to cause biases in 
decision-making under uncertainty. Also, people tend to have unstable preferences for risk 
when the outcome is framed (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981; Kahneman, 2003), affected by 
emotions (Lerner and Keltner, D, 2000; Lerner, Keltner, and Diener, 2001) and when people 
are put under time pressure (Nursimulu and Bossaerts, 2014; Saqib and Chan, 2015). 
Researchers have examined if environmental stressors (e.g., a time constraint given a fixed 
amount of information) makes people more risk-seeking (Streufert, Streufert, and Denson, 
1983). However, there has not been much research on how other potential stressors, such as 
information load under time pressure, affect risk preferences. 
Information is another crucial part of decision-making. Be it risk-related or time 
constrained, information plays an important part. It has been shown that people tend to look at 
information differently under time constraints (Maule et al., 2000), they argued that we 
accelerate our processing of information when a time constraint is applied. Hasida and Shlomo 
(1981) showed that people seem to filter information more heavily the stricter the time 
constraint is, trying to focus more on what appears to be the most vital information. 
In this paper, we analyze whether the amount of information affects people’s risk 
preferences under time pressure. Our paper differs from other work, as we do not vary the time 
constraint, but we change the amount of information. Having to consider additional parameters 
to make a decision is highly relevant in our increasingly information-intensive world. Chewning 
and Harrell (1990) tested the prospect of information overload in a financial situation and found 
that participants who experienced information overload tended to make decisions of lesser 
quality. The application of this prospect for our research is highly relevant. 
The purpose of our research is to investigate if people appear more risk-seeking when 
information load increases. Thus, our research question is: do people behave more risk-seeking 
when information load increases? In the experiment, the participants were asked to process 
information related to an “Eckel and Grossman test of risk aversion” -style gamble with six 
gambles, each paying a low and a high payoff, with a 50/50 chance of receiving each payoff. 
Where the information-part detailed a crucial piece that had to be used in the gamble to calculate 
the high payoff for each gamble. The amount of information given in the experiment varied 
between participants. Half of the respondents answered an “easy” version with little information 
giving them more time to focus on the gamble, while the other half got an information-heavy 
version where more time had to be allocated to deduct the crucial piece of information. Lastly, 
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participants were asked to answer general questions about themselves and their general risk-
attitudes. Six questions were picked from the DOSPERT-scale test (Weber, Blais and Betz, 
2002). Spread across financial, ethical and physical risk aspects. 
From our experiment, we find that subject did not appear more risk-seeking when 
information load increased. In our research we argue that based on applicable theory, the 
treatment group will display a higher level of risk-seeking than the control group which we find 
no evidence for. Overall, participants chose the riskiest gamble most often. This gamble has the 
highest payoff, 70 SEK, roughly a lunch worth of money in the school’s canteen, and 5 SEK as 
the low payoff. Deducting from the DOSPERT-scale results, participants displayed no profound 
love or distaste for risk. The average score was indeed very average. Implications for the field 
of behavioral economics is quite limited. Several weaknesses in the experimental design will 
be discussed later, which likely had a noticeable effect on the outcome. Although, it is obvious 
that students find the prospect of a free lunch very appealing. 
 
 
2 Literature review 
 
In this section, a literature overview of the previous research regarding decision theory will be 
presented, in the areas of Economics, Psychology, and Cognitive Neuroscience. These areas of 
research aim to understand and describe how humans make decisions based on evaluation and 
judgments of predicted outcomes, as well as the biases that can occur (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1974; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).  The areas of Economics, Psychology and Cognitive 
Neuroscience all contributes, aiming to explore and develop theories of decision-making. 
Economists have provided normative models of decision-making, i.e., how we should make 
decisions, while Psychologists have presented descriptive models of decision-making, i.e., how 
we do make decisions. Neuroscientists contribute to theories of the relationship between 
behavior and the brain (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).  
For investigation of the research question, emphasis will be given to the Psychological theories 
since they are extended theories from Economic theories of decision-making. Also, the 
Cognitive Neuroscientific perspective of decision-making is overviewed to illustrate findings 
of biological mechanisms of decision-making. 
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2.1 The Economic Perspective of Decision-Making 
Economists have provided a normative approach to decision theory, called Expected Utility 
Theory which is derived from Neoclassical Economics. Neoclassical Economics focuses on 
maximizing or minimizing given parameters such as utility, risk, production, and time. The 
Expected Utility Theory relies on several assumptions regarding that humans behave rational, 
such as they seek to maximize utility given the highest expected value, have stable preferences, 
and changes in outcome are perceived in absolute value. Regarding risk preferences, humans 
are assumed to mostly be risk-averse related to investments. In other words, many investors 
prefer a sure gain to a chance to win money. In contrast, a human can be considered as risk-
seeking if they prefer a chance to win money to a sure gain (Perloff, 2014).  However, the 
Expected Utility Theory has been questioned by Psychologists, suggesting that some of the 
assumptions that the economic theory of decision-making relies on must be relaxed to 
investigate how humans make decisions. Also, researchers suggest that human have unstable 
preferences for risk, i.e., shifting between being risk-averse and risk-seeking, depending on for 
example, how the outcome is described and time available to the decision-maker (Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1979; Simon, 1955 among others). 
 
 
2.2 The Psychological Perspective of Decision-Making 
Studies in the psychological field have focused on how people make judgments about 
probabilities for the occurrence of future events, and where the probability is a measure of risk 
(Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982; Kahneman, 2003 among others). Researchers have 
provided empirical evidence and theoretical explanations that support the theory that people do 
not always behave rationally as suggested by the economic theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979; Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky, 1982; Kahneman, 2003). For instance, the constraints 
(e.g., time and money) assumed in the Expected Utility Theory might be in nature of external 
as well as internal (e.g., level of knowledge and cognitive capacity) characteristics (Simon, 
1955). Also, Tversky and Kahneman (1979) conducted some experiments where they 
demonstrated that humans do not always choose the outcome with the highest expected value 
as suggested by the economic theory, but rather the outcome that humans subjectively perceive 
as satisfying. 
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2.2.1 Bounded Rationality and Dual System Process 
In the last 50 years, psychologists have extended their work and presented models that describe 
human behavior and judgment in risky and uncertain contexts (Simon, 1955; Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1979). Simon (1955) proposed that humans are “rationally bounded” and seek 
outcomes that are satisfying rather then maximizing the decision-makers utility, thus not only 
focusing on optimization and maximization of parameters. Furthermore, Kahneman (2003) 
suggested that there are two cognitive systems in the brain that operates for perception and 
judgment. These perceptual systems demand different levels of mental activity, and they are 
capable of processing information at various speed. System 1 correspond to the intuitive 
judgment of humans, it is fast, autonomous, and operates unconsciously. For instance, when 
humans recognize faces, casual propensity, and distances. System 2 is slow, effortful, and 
require attention. It operates when analyzing information and reasoning, such as mental 
arithmetic activities (Kahneman, 2011).  Also, human perception is reference-dependent, 
suggesting that stimulus is perceived different due to changes and states. 
 
 
2.2.2 The Prospect Theory 
In 1979, Tversky and Kahneman presented the Prospect Theory, which is a descriptive model 
of how people make decisions under risk and uncertainty. The Prospect theory consists of 
a value function that represent the tendency for people to evaluate and perceive changes in 
outcome due to a subjective natural reference point, and not in absolute value as suggested by 
the Economic theory. The reference point is subjective and inconstant, determined by factors 
such as experience, expectation, and preferences between prospects (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1979; Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 1991). The value function (Figure 1) replaces the utility 
function and demonstrates the characteristic that changes in utility are regarding whether 
humans perceive the outcome as either a gain or a loss, determined relative to the reference point 
(origo of the value function). 
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Moreover, the value function has several characteristics. First, it displays loss aversion 
which means the decrease in utility for losses looms higher than the increase in utility for gains 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1979). It is illustrated by an S-shaped curve for their value function, 
showing that the change in utility is not an absolute value, but rather that evaluations and 
perceptions are based on expectations and measured according to a reference point. Second, 
people have mental accounts for investments, hence, different reference points for different 
investments. When evaluating outcomes, people tend to compare outcomes within categories 
instead of comparing all outcomes in absolute value (Thaler, Tversky, Kahneman, and 
Schwartz, 1997). 
 
 
2.2.3  Heuristics and Biases in Decision-making 
Previous work has provided empirical evidence that humans are prone to applying heuristics to 
evaluate outcomes in decision-making. The application of heuristics can lead to cognitive biases 
that can affect perception and judgement. For example, framing, anchoring, and emotions might 
affect the decision-making process (Kahneman, Slovic, Tversky, 1982; Nickerson and Salovey, 
1998; Thaler, 2008; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974 among others). Heuristics are “rule of 
thumbs” applied consciously as well as unconsciously, to simplify judgment of probabilistic 
(risky) outcomes. These heuristics may give rise to systematic estimate errors in the judgmental 
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operation and lead to biases when evaluating outcomes, meaning that the subjective perception 
of an outcome can deviate from reality (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974).   
  
 
2.2.3.1 The Framing Effect 
The Economic theory suggests that decisions should be evaluated and based on the expected 
value of the outcomes and should not be affected by how the outcome is described. However, 
Tversky and Kahneman (1981) suggested that a “framing effect” can occur due to how the 
outcome is described, which might cause a reversal of preferences for risky outcomes. In their 
research, they presented two decision-problems with two prospects to participants, with equal 
expected value. They found that when the outcome was framed in terms of gains, people tend 
to be risk-averse: preferring a sure gain to the chance of winning money. Although, yet when 
the outcome was framed in terms of losses, people tended to be risk-seeking: preferring a chance 
to lose money to a sure loss. Thus the relative attractiveness of risky outcomes can be affected 
depending on if the outcome is framed in terms of gains or losses. Framing of an outcome 
affects the location of the reference point, where a change in reference point influences the 
evaluation of the outcome that might cause reversal of preferences of risk. The reversal of 
preferences might cause people to shift between being risk-averse and risk-seeking, depending 
on how the outcome is framed (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). 
 
 
2.2.3.2 The Anchoring Effect 
The anchoring effect is the tendency for people to adjust their estimation of an outcome based 
on an initial value presented in a decision-problem (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). An anchor 
value can be a current state or an expectation and can occur semantically as well as strategically 
if the anchor is compatible with the response scale (Chapman and Johnson, 1994). The anchor 
can influence the location of the reference point used in the estimation of value as well as the 
perception of the outcome (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). For example, a salary proposal for 
50 000 SEK will be perceived as a gain for a person with a current salary of 40 000 SEK, but a 
loss for a person earning 60 000 SEK. The prospect theory suggests that the person that gets a 
decrease in salary of 10 000 SEK will experience a larger loss than the experienced utility of 
the person that currently earn 40 000 SEK. Furthermore, if a person expected to get his/her 
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salary increased from 50 000 SEK to 70 000 SEK, yet instead get 60 000 SEK, this might be 
perceived as a loss even if it is a gain of 10 000 SEK in absolute value (Kahneman, 1992). 
 
 
2.2.3.3 Influences of Emotions on Decision-Making  
Emotions can arise due to environmental stressors, such as information load and time 
constraints, and might affect task performance as well as risk behavior (Streufert, Streufert, and 
Denson, 1983). The affect heuristic is the tendency for humans to rely on their emotional 
response to make judgments (Slovic et al., 2007). People might be more prone to replicate 
emotions from one situation to the next (Tiedens et al., 2001) and rely on some affect under 
time pressure (Slovic, P. et al., 2005). In complex decision-situations, exposure to 
environmental stressors might cause the decision-maker to experience mental strain which can 
cause stress, which later affects performance to various extent (Streufert, Streufert, and Denson, 
1983). According to Streufert and Streufert (1970), mental strain can cause participants to avoid 
effort in task performance, which might be associated with risk-taking behavior.  
 
 
2.2.3.4 The Effect of Time Pressure on Decision-Making 
A time constraint can be a potential environmental stressor to the decision-maker, causing 
mental strain and affect risk preferences (Streufert, Streufert, and Denson, 1983). When the 
time is limited people make systematic errors when assessing information to reduce complexity 
due to capacity limits of the brain, which might affect performance and accuracy of judgment 
(Kahneman, 2003). Ordóñez and Benson (1997) have investigated risk preferences when time 
is limited in the decision-making process, and suggest that reversal of preferences can occur. In 
their research, participants rated the attractiveness of buying prices for gambles under a time 
constraint. The researchers found that participants tended to change decision-strategies which 
affect the location of the reference point, used as an anchor point for the evaluation of outcomes. 
Further, this might cause participants to reverse their preferences for buying prices (Ordóñez 
and Benson, 1997). Given a time constraint, when people are confronted with information in a 
judgmental situation, the information has to be processed faster, which might require a different 
strategy for the decision-making to happen and it can also be biased (Nursimulu and Bossaerts, 
2014). 
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Moreover, Nursimulu and Bossaerts (2014) and Saqib and Chan (2015) demonstrated that 
people reverse their preferences for risk when put under time pressure, and also seeks to 
maximize the potential outcome if the outcome is framed in terms of gains. A time constraint 
might cause people to experience stress, and causes the decision-makers to shift the reference 
point to the maximal outcome, which affects the evaluation and judgment of the actual outcome 
(Saqib and Chan, 2015). 
Over time, people can gradually acquire and refine skills by practice, learning to assert 
attentions to information that is relevant to assess and solve a task as reported by Gonzalez, 
Lerch, and Lebiere (2003). Moreover, the mechanisms in dynamic environments, such as 
accumulation of knowledge, an adaptation of strategies, and feedback, also impact the decision-
making process (Gonzalez, Lerch, and Lebiere, 2003). 
  
 
2.3 Cognitive Neuroscientific Perspective of Decision-Making  
In addition to the economic and psychological research in decision-making, the growing field 
of Neuroscience explores the cognitive system of the brain and the underlying mechanisms of 
decision-making. With the advancement of technology, Neuroscience has provided valuable 
insights into encoding information (Drake, 1991; Lieberman and Eisenberg, 2000), and has 
enabled researchers to contribute to the dual-process theory, investigating how system 1 and 
system 2 in the brain operates (McLeod, P. et al., 1998; Baddeley, 2000). 
By using direct information measures, such as Blood oxygenation level dependent 
(BOLD) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), scientists can measure changes in 
blood pressure, blood oxygenation, and blood volumes that are associated with brain activity. 
These measures allow researchers to investigate underlying mechanisms and map brain activity, 
supporting the dual-system theory (Detre and Wang, 2002; Matthews and Jezzard, 2004). 
System 1 is associated with instinct behavior, associated learning process (Baddeley, 2000), 
and system 2 is associated with sequential, abstract thinking, and simulation of future events, 
but are limited by working memory (McLeod, P. et al., 1998). Likewise, integration of these 
systems enables the brain to process information at a very high speed (Potter et al., 2014). 
However, researchers have shown there are capacity limits of the brain regarding attention, the 
amount of information that is storable, and attended into working memory (Marois and Ivanoff, 
2005; Potter et al. 2014). 
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3 Hypothesis 
 
The purpose of this research is to investigate if an increase in information load can be a potential 
stressor to the decision-maker and cause them to be more risk-seeking when the outcome is in 
terms of gains. Based on previous research we state the following hypothesis: If people are 
confronted with increased information load in the decision-making process, then they will 
behave more risk seeking. 
 
4 Method 
 
This section will detail all information related to the method used in this research. First, the 
experimental method will be motivated. Second, the motivation of experimental design, the 
elicitation method used, and the treatment variation in the experiment will be explained. Third, 
the questionnaires used in the experiment will be motivated, and the structure of the experiment 
will be explained. Lastly, the procedure of how the experiment was carried out will be handled. 
 
 
4.1 Experimental Method 
For this paper, we choose to conduct our research through a controlled in-class lab experiment, 
as opposed to a field experiment. With the limited time available and precise procedures 
required to elicit risk preferences with individuals, the lab-style experiment is a clear choice. 
Field experiments are often argued to be more “realistic” in the sense that they are carried out 
in uncontrolled real-life situations (Morton and Williams, 2008). However, in recent years, lab 
experiments have gained ground based on their ability to strictly control the conditions in which 
they are conducted (Falk and Heckman, 2009), which directly applies to the requirements of 
our research. 
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4.2  Experimental Design 
The design of the experiment was constructed with the purpose to be a natural but accurate way 
of eliciting risk preferences given the research question and the target audience. Since the total 
time available for a test in a class with undergraduate students were at maximum fifteen 
minutes, it was essential to construct an experimental design that would be understandable in 
written communication. 
 
4.2.1 Elicitation Method 
In the experiment, a modified version of the “Eckel and Grossman-method” was used 
(Appendix A) as elicitation method related to the financial-risk domain. Charness, Gneezy, and 
Imas (2012) presented an overview of different methods for risk elicitations. As suggested in 
their paper, the researchers have to consider the research question that wants to be investigated 
and the sample population in consideration when choosing a method for risk elicitation. The 
Eckel and Grossman-table provide a straightforward overview of the risky choices available to 
participants, and the method can be incentivized with real money, which has been shown to 
provide accurate results in real-world studies (Dave et al., 2010). For instance, Eckel and 
Grossman (2002) used this method when investigating gender differences in risk preference. 
Moreover, the incentive effect has been investigated by Holt and Laury (2002). They compared 
experiments where the financial outcome in a lottery was an insubstantial amount of money and 
a real amount of money. Their findings suggest that when the money was just hypothesized, 
participants exhibited a lower level of risk aversion, compared to studies where participants 
were incentivized. Also, participants tended to respond and exhibit risk aversion to a larger 
extent when the financial incentive was scaled up. In comparison, when the hypothetical 
payoffs were scaled up, participants were unaffected and did not show any change in the level 
of risk aversion (Holt and Laury, 2002). Thus, when conducting the risk elicitation, we wanted 
to account for the incentive effect to get an accurate examination of participant’s attitude toward 
risk when the quantity of information is manipulated. The possibility of winning real money 
also contributes to incentivize participants to engage in the experiment fully. 
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Gamble number   Low payoff (SEK) High payoff (SEK)   
1  30 20+X = 30  
2  25 48-X = 38  
3  20 30+X+6 = 46  
4  15 64-X = 54  
5  10 12+60-X = 62  
6  5 80-X = 70  
     
 
Eckel and Grossman-table used in our experiment with calculated payoffs. X = 10. 
 
Our version of the “Eckel and Grossman-table” that can be seen above differs from the 
original in the sense that it does not convey all necessary information right away. In Part 1 of 
the experiment, the value for X has to be deducted from supplied information, which will be 
discussed later. X is then used to calculate each payoff for participants to choose their desired 
gamble. Gamble 1 is considered to signal low levels of risk-seeking behavior, and gamble 6 to 
signal high levels of risk-seeking behavior. Although a weakness of this method is the ceiling 
effect that applies to gamble 6. The method cannot deduct whether a participant would appear 
more risk-seeking than that of gamble 6, given the opportunity. “Would he/she trade the last 5 
SEK of the low payoff for the opportunity to win even more?” is a question that this table cannot 
answer. 
There are some further aspects of this elicitation method that must be considered. First, 
this elicitation method is only framed in terms of gains. Based on methods used in previous 
research where the effect of time pressure on risk preferences has been investigated, outcomes 
in terms of losses were excluded from this experiment (Saqib and Chan, 2015). Also, due to 
time constraints and budget constraints for this research, the inclusion of losses was considered 
to be too extensive. Second, this method can only categorize participants as “risk-averse,” “risk 
neutral,” or “risk-seeking.” Hence, it is not possible to determine to which extent a participant 
is risk-seeking, compared to another participant that is also categorized as “risk-seeking” 
(Charness, Gneezy, and Imas, 2012). Notwithstanding, the “Eckel and Grossman-method” was 
considered as a valid method for this research, since previous research has shown that people 
are risk-averse when the outcome is framed in terms of gains (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). 
Third, as the “Eckel and Grossman-method has been shown to be appropriate when eliciting 
risk preferences, it has only been proven to be accurate when conveyed in English (Eckel and 
Grossman, 2002). Therefore, the choice for this experiment was to present the information in 
English, although, participants were expected to be Swedish speaking.  
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An alternative way to present the information in the symbolic form would be to use an 
elicitation method that uses visual information. Lejuez et al. (2002) presented The Balloon 
Analogue Risk Task (BART) to elicit risk preferences. In that experiment, participants are 
presented with visual information; they are shown a balloon, and their task is to determine how 
much to pump up the balloon before it cracks. Their potential earning increases with the size of 
the balloon, however, the risk that the balloon will also crack increases, and if the balloon 
cracks, the participant loses his or her earnings. As Jackson, McClelland, Kimble, and Gregory 
(1979) suggests, there is no relationship between visual perception and reading comprehension. 
Thus, the experimental design of BART can examine risk preferences and still account for 
inabilities in reading comprehension, which was not a possibility in our experimental design. 
However, this elicitation method requires all participants to use a computer in a lab, which was 
not possible at the time of the experiment. Also, there was no clear connection to how 
information load could be connected to the elicitation method. 
 
4.2.2 Treatment Variation 
To investigate if increased information load makes people more risk-seeking, the increase in 
the amount of information was assigned to the treatment group. Participants were randomly 
divided into a control group and a treatment group. Both groups were allowed the same time to 
perform the task and provided with identical task description and a table. The table was required 
to be used by participants to calculate a value given in the instructions. The design of the table 
aimed to require effort such as using information from the instructions simultaneously as mental 
arithmetic. 
 
Table:    
 A B C 
1 2 13 15 
2 P 10   
3 6 2 25+25 
       
 
The table used in the experiment.  
 
 
The instructions in the experimental part conveyed the same value of the number X. The 
control group was given less information to calculate X in part 1: 
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“Look at the table. Look at the top row of the table. Sum all the numbers in that row. Divide that sum 
by 3, and find that number in the table. Look at the number in the cell below. You now have the number 
X!” 
 
However, the treatment group was given longer and more complex amount of information 
to calculate X in part 1: 
 
“Look at the table. Look at the top row of the table. Sum all the numbers in that row. Divide that sum 
by 3, and find that number in the table. Look at the number in the cell below. Multiply that number by 
5. Take that value and add to the value of cell C3. Divide the number you calculated in the last step by 
the number in the orange cell. You now have the number X!” 
 
Thus, the length of the instructions was longer for the treatment group. The way that the 
information was displayed aimed to make a considerable difference in the effort required by 
participants in their respective groups. The purpose of presenting less information to the control 
group was to give them enough time for the calculation of X, and not to feel any time 
pressure.  In comparison, by giving the treatment group more information, i.e. a longer text to 
read, they had to process the information faster to perform the calculation of X within the time 
constraint. Hence, this was considered to impose time pressure.  
 
4.2.3 Questionnaires 
In addition to monetary incentivized experiments, questionnaires on behavior are commonly 
used for eliciting risk preferences. Weber, Blais, and Betz (2002) provide empirical evidence 
that attitude towards risk can differ across risky domains. For example, a person can be risk-
averse regarding financial risk, yet risk-seeking regarding risk related to social life. Therefore, 
six questions from the DOSPERT-scale (Weber, Blais, and Betz, 2002) were considered to be 
relevant to control for differences in domain-specific risk preferences.  
When questionnaires elicit risk preferences, participants are encouraged to state their 
propensity for risk on a scale. For example, “Rate your willingness to participate in a risky 
lottery” from a scale of 1–10, where 1 corresponds to “less willing to participate,” and 10 
corresponds to “more willing to participate.” However, these questionnaires are often self-
reported and not incentivized. Also, empirical evidence suggests that people tend to differ in 
attitude toward risk, depending on the elicited domain (Dreber, A. et al., 2011). However, 
Weber, Blais, and Betz (2002), developed the DOSPERT-scale to capture individual differences 
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in risk preferences. The DOSPERT-scale includes self-estimation questionnaires about risk in 
the domains of health, finance, social life, and ethics (Weber, Blais, and Betz, 2002). Their 
questionnaires consist of a scale from 1 to 7 describing the likeliness to engage or perform the 
related action where 1 is “Extremely Unlikely” and 7 “Extremely Likely.” However, a 
weakness of questionnaires is that participants might perceive the situation different afterward, 
depending on the outcome (Christensen-Szalanski and Willham, 1991). Also, self-reporting 
does not reveal the exact causal relationship, since there might be other factors in the 
environment that affect the reported score (Spector, 1994). 
 
 
4.2.4 Structure of the Experiment  
The experiment was set up to consist of three sections. Section one provided participants with 
general instructions about the experiment and urging participants to comply with the restrictions 
a timed experiment imply. As a way of controlling that participants had understood the 
instructions given, and taken in the necessary information, it was stated in section one that 
participants could only get the opportunity to be paid if they calculated the right number for X. 
Section two included the actual experiment, divided into two parts. Part one provided a 3x3 
table and instructions. The table included numbers, mathematical functions, and colors. Given 
the table, participants were urged to follow the instructions and calculate a number denoted X. 
When participants had calculated X, they were supposed to continue to part two of the 
experiment. In part two, participants were provided the Eckel and Grossman-table, consisting 
of six gambles including information about the low payoff for each gamble as well as a function 
of X to calculate the high payoff for each gamble. Section three included general questions, 
such as gender, education, age and five general questions chosen from the DOSPERT scale 
(Weber, Blais, and Betz, 2002). Participants were also asked to report their level of stress and 
then briefly explain their strategy when they performed the experiment. 
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4.3 The Procedure 
The experiment was carried out at the School of Business, Economics, and Law at the 
University of Gothenburg, with 125 undergraduate students (65 men and 60 women). In the 
experiment, all participants had a ten percent chance to win a cash payout to control for the 
incentive effect, which has been shown to influence the level of risk aversion and make 
participants slightly more risk-averse (Holt and Laury, 2002). Participants were randomly 
assigned to be either in the control group or the treatment group. However, the chance to be 
assigned to the treatment group or the control group was equal. 
Before the experiment was conducted, a pilot study was conducted with 29 participants. 
The pilots were timed to determine a reasonable time constraint. Also, the pilot study aimed to 
construct the design of the table used in the experiment. The pilot study showed that the 
participants could perform the task in between two and a half minutes and three minutes. 
Consequently, two minutes and forty-five seconds were considered to be an appropriate time 
constraint in the experiment and was set equally for the control group and the treatment group. 
At the time of the experiment, a paper with the experiment was handed out to the 
participants in the class. Five minutes were given to participants for reading the first 
instructions, two minutes and forty-five seconds for the experimental parts, and five minutes 
for answering the questions in the third section. Then, all papers were handed in, and the data 
was compiled and statistically analyzed in STATA, where the treatment variation was 
investigated. When the experiment was over, ten percent of participants that had calculated the 
right number of X was selected for the gamble. In the gamble, a coin was tossed for each of the 
selected participants. The participant was paid the high payoff if the coin showed tails, and 
received the low payoff if the coin showed head. 
 
 
5 Results 
 
This section contains the results from the experiment. First, descriptive statistics detailing all 
measurable values from each group as well as pooled together. Second, an analysis of reported 
stress level between groups. Third, an analysis of chosen gambles for each group and final 
words. 
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5.1 Descriptive 
Table 1 depicts descriptive information from the experiment.  
Table 1    
  Control Treatment Total 
Number of observations 55 70 125 
    
Percent of right answers 0,96 0,60 0,68 
    
Mean gamble (1-6) 4.58 4.83 4.70 
    
Gamble variance 3.27 2.66 2.96 
    
Gamle st.div. 1.81 1.63 1.72 
    
Percent missed gambles 0,09 0,33 0,22 
    
Percent female 0,53 0,44 0,48 
    
Mean age 24.42 23.80 24.07 
    
Reported mean stress (1-7) 3.45 3.97 3.74 
        
    
Mean answer (1-7)    
Q1. Invest 10% of annual income 4.98 4.87 4.92 
    
Q2. Return lost and found wallet 1.98 1.84 1.90 
    
Q3. Walk home alone at night 3.80 3.61 3.70 
    
Q4. Choose enjoyable career over safe 5.55 4.89 5.18 
    
Q5. Engage in plagiarism 1.69 1.97 1.85 
    
Q6. Bungee jump off a tall bridge 4.05 3.89 3.96 
    
Overall risk score (6-42) 22.05 21.07 21.50 
 
“Percent of right answers” show how many percents in each group that managed to give the right answer for the 
calculation in part 1. “Percent missed gambles” show how many percents of participants that missed to choose a 
gamble in each group. The “Mean answer (1-7)” section displays the average score from each of the six questions 
picked from the DOSPERT-scale with the total average displayed at the end. 
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Table 1 details relevant descriptive statistics from the experiment. A total of 125 people 
took part in our experiment, 70 in the treatment group and 55 in the control group. Only 60% 
of participants in the treatment group managed to answer the question in Part 1 correctly as 
opposed to 96.63% in the control group. The complexity of the information for the treatment 
group was indeed much higher than that of the control group, although not to such a degree that 
40% of participants should get it wrong. The reason is more likely a combination of the stress 
factor and pure misinterpretation. As can be seen from a quick glance both the treatment group 
and the control group show relatively similar numbers overall. Contrary to our hypothesis both 
groups examined very similar values for the gambling part, with 4.58 and 4.83 respectively, 
4.70 for both groups combined on the 6-grade scale. These results show relativly high of risk-
seeking for all groups regardless of information amount. The treatment group exhibited slightly 
higher percentage male participants. This is due to the random selection process of group 
participants. Although, we can see no gender effect on which gamble participants chose (t(95) 
= 0.3465, p > 0.1 overall) (t(48) = 1.0462, p > 0.1 for the control group, t(45) = -0.7926, p > 
0.1 for the treatment group), it is often believed that women are more risk averse than men 
which were shown by Irwin et al. (1988), which in term would imply that the treatment group 
has a positive bias in regard to risk-seeking, but no such effect was found. It could also be 
interesting to note that 32.86% of participants in the treatment group missed to gamble 
altogether leaving us with only 47 observations out of 70 to work with in our detailed analysis. 
The reported stress level is only slightly higher for the treatment group which would only 
partially explain the reason for the missed gambles. Also “reported stress” is an arbitrary 
measure and conclusions drawn from it should be taken with a grain of salt. 
The inclusion of six questions from the DOSPERT-scale gave further insight into the risk-
behavior of the participants. Answers in this section should in no way be affected by which 
group participants belong to. They are solely objective views of the participant's risk 
preferences, and as expected, results between the two groups are very similar. On average, the 
participants displayed high willingness to invest a part of their income in a safe mutual fund 
(Question 1). Question 2 stated “likelihood to not return a lost and found wallet”. The average 
score here was low. “Likelihood to walk home alone in an unsafe part of town” (Question 3) 
showed a slight unwillingness in general from all participants with female participants far less 
likely to engage in this activity (t(123) = 5.10, p < 0.01). Question 4 asked participants whether 
they would choose a career they truly enjoy over a safe one with only slightly over average 
score exhibiting general indifference to the statement. Question 5 was of great academic 
importance. “Likelihood to engage in plagiarism”, the average score here was very low. Lastly 
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and potentially the most “risky” question, likeliness to bungee jump off a tall bridge. A slight 
overall unwillingness is displayed here. The only question that displayed a significant 
difference between groups was Question 4 (t(123) = 2.67, p < 0.01), although without any 
further implications for our result. The minor difference shown here is not enough to cause any 
overall shifts in risk behavior. Participants displayed at large a very risk neutral stance with a 
total average score of 21.5 out of 42 available points. Causing us to conclude that the test 
subjects were observably not more risk-seeking nor more risk-averse than each other (t(123) = 
1.2494, p > 0.1) or the average person.   
 
 
5.2 Stress Level  
Table 2 displays the output from a t-test between the control and treatment group regarding their stress 
levels. The test was done with full sample regardless if subject chose a gamble or not. 
Table 2     
     
T-test for Stress level by group assuming equal variance 
     
  N Mean Std. Error Std. Div. 
Control 55 3.45 0.25 1.81 
Treatment 70 3.97 0.19 1.62 
     
 
Tests for normality gave varying results. Shapiro-Wilk's test of normality could not be rejected. 
However, Skewness and Kurtosis tests rejected normality for the treatment group and looking 
at the histograms of distributions we can with some certainty reject normality. Hence, we cannot 
trust the results from table 2 that provide weak significant evidence that stress levels were 
different between the control group (M = 3.45 S.D. = 1.81) and treatment group (M = 3.97 S.D. 
= 1.62) (t(123) = -1.6777, p < 0.1). It is not in line with what we wanted to achieve with the 
experiment. Although as stated, “reported stress” is an arbitrary measure and it cannot be taken 
as conclusive proof that participants in the treatment group did not feel an increase in stress 
levels. However, it can be argued that given the difference in information load and comments 
of “too tight” time frame to complete the “treatment group test” there could be an unobserved 
difference. Tests for equal variance could not be rejected.  Controlling for unequal variance 
causes no significance (p > 0.1). However, we assumed equal variance from earlier testing and 
chose to disregard these findings. 
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The graph displays the distribution of perceived stress level for the treatment group. 
 
 
 
The graph displays the distribution of perceived stress level for the control group. 
 
Table 3 presents a non-parametric Man-Whitney U-test comparing the two groups without making 
assumptions about the distribution. 
Table 3    
    
Man-Whitney U-test    
  N Rank Sum Expected 
Control 55 3152 3465 
Treatment 70 4725 4410 
 
The Man-Whitney test shifts the significance level above 0.1 (z = -1.581 p > 0.1) causing 
us to disregard the findings of the above T-test and further conclude that participants did not 
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experience any significant difference in reported stress between groups. These findings could 
imply that we will not have any significant difference in gambles because we have no stress 
effect from varying information between groups. 
 
 
5.3 Gamble 
Table 4 displays the output from a t-test between the control and treatment group regarding 
their chosen gamble. The test was done with the full sample regardless if subject answered 
correctly or not in Part 1. 
Table 4     
     
T-test for Gamble by group assuming equal variance  
     
  N Mean Std. Error Std. Div. 
Control 50 4.58 0.26 1.81 
Treatment 47 4.83 0.24 1.63 
 
We find that there is no significant difference between the control group (M = 4.58 S.D. = 1.81) 
and treatment group (M = 4.83 S.D. = 1.63) regarding which gamble they chose (t (95) = -
0.7126, p > 0.1). There is no evidence of unequal variance and controlling for unequal variance 
show no mentionable difference in the result. Given these results, we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis, i.e. that subjects would not be more risk-seeking given more information. 
Controlling for the robustness of the model by comparing results of subjects who answered 
correctly in part 1 of the experiment to the full dataset as well as including several control 
variables such as age, gender and stress level causes no significant change in our result and 
conclusion of the information effect (See Appendix E for table). For our analysis, we choose to 
include the full dataset to capture any potential effect that stress has on the chosen gamble that 
is included in subjects who failed to give the correct answer in part 1 of the experiment. 
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The graph displays the distribution for chosen gamble for the treatment group. 
 
The graph displays the distribution for chosen gamble for the treatment group. 
Table 5 presents a non-parametric Man-Whitney U-test comparing the two groups without 
making assumptions about the distribution. 
Table 5    
    
Man-Whitney U-test    
  N Rank Sum Expected 
Control 50 2359 2450 
Treatment 47 2394 2303 
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A test of normality shows that the distributions are not normal, and we hence test the data 
using a Man-Whitney U-test. Not assuming normal distribution does not change the outcome 
of the test. (z = -0.710, p > 0.1). Increased information load does not change chosen gamble in 
our experiment. 
Conclusively, we fail to reject our null hypothesis, i.e. that more information does not 
make people more risk-seeking. Also, the stress level was not affected by increasing the 
information load. Although, distributions were presumed not to be normally distributed to reach 
that conclusion. Gamble was not significantly different between groups when increasing the 
information load, failing to reject the null hypothesis.  
Notably no differences could be found in perceived stress level between gender (t(123) = 
0.4808, p > 0.1) or age groups (t(123) = 1.15, p > 0.1). Though participants who did not manage 
to choose a gamble perceived that test as more stressful (t(123) = 2.8388, p < 0.01). Controlling 
for unequal variance and not normally distributed samples caused no significant shifts in either 
of the above tests. 
 
 
6 Discussion 
 
In this section, the result based on the previous research will be discussed. Then, limits of the 
research will be considered and lastly, proposals for future research. 
 
 
6.1 General Discussion of the Result 
The results of this research show there is no significant effect of increased information load in 
the decision-making process that make participants more risk-seeking. In the experiment, 
participants showed on average consistency in their risk preferences in the control group as well 
as the treatment group. Further, when examining the results from the DOSPERT-scale, neither 
group displayed any excessive risk-seeking nor risk-aversive behavior that would in some way 
distort or alter the results. Hence, the results of the experiment do not support the hypothesis 
that people behave more risk-seeking when confronting more information. 
The comments written by the participants of how they thought when they chose a gamble, 
provided us with insights into how they were affected by the time constraint. A general 
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comment given by participants in the treatment group was that they did not rethink their 
decision and “did just pick a gamble.” Also, many commented that they chose the gamble with 
the highest payoff because they could not lose anything. One possible explanation for the 
overall high willingness to choose the highest paying gamble could be that the outcome in the 
gambles were framed in terms of gains and due to the anchoring effect. This explanation would 
be consistent with Nursimulu and Bossaerts’ (2014) and Saqib and Chan’s (2015) findings, that 
time pressure might cause participants to maximize the potential outcome when the outcome is 
framed in terms of gains. Also, it was suggested by the lecturer before the experiment began 
that the potentially high payoff was roughly 70 SEK, corresponding to a lunch worth of money 
in the school’s cafeteria. This might have created an anchor for judgment and thus influencing 
the location of the reference point when participants evaluated each gamble (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1974). The lunch at the canteen where compatible with the response scale as it roughly 
corresponds to the high payoff in one of the gambles, which might have caused participants to 
discard all other gambles in favor for the highest paying gamble. 
Some participants in the control group and the treatment group did not manage to 
calculate X and choose any gamble. However, they reported that they experienced stress due to 
the time constraint, which is consistent with the research reported by Saqib and Chan (2015). 
As suggested by Streufert, Streufert, and Denson (1983) an environmental stressor (e.g., 
information load and time constraint) might have caused the participant to experience mental 
strain due to increased information load, and time pressure because of the time constraint. The 
mental strain and time pressure might have caused the participant to experience stress, which 
might affect task performance and risk preferences. Therefore, some participants might have 
abstained from calculating X and choose a gamble. However, based on this research, we cannot 
disentangle whether the absence of an answer is evidence that the risk preference of participants 
is affected or that this is a weakness of the experimental design. For example, it is likely that 
participants did not fully understand the task, there could have been lack of motivation to 
complete the calculations and choose a gamble, disabilities in mental arithmetic, or that they 
just required more time to finish it. 
Further, the theory of affect heuristics indicates that the influence of emotions, such as 
the feeling of stress, have an effect of how people perceive risk (Lerner and Keltner, D, 2000; 
Slovic, P. et al., 2005). Some of the participants indicated that they perceived the time constraint 
negatively as it gave rise to stress and the feeling of uncertainty. One participant even gave up 
after a minute or so, claiming that she could not handle the pressure of these kinds of tests. The 
role of emotions is an important part to consider in the decision-making process. The variation 
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in the amount of information might not have a significant effect on risk preferences. However, 
the emotion that arises due to the information load and a time constraint might trigger negative 
emotions and change perceptions of risk. According to Tiedens et al. (2001), emotions affect 
our judgment and perception of an event, which might cause people to feel either certain or 
uncertain about a choice. Depending on this mental stage, people may replicate this emotion to 
the following decision which can have an impact on the decision (Tiedens et al., 2001). In our 
experiment, any feeling of uncertainty about the accuracy of their calculation of the number X 
in Part 1 might have been incorporated when the participants were urged to choose a gamble in 
part 2, making people to either refuse to make a choice or “just pick a gamble”. 
Parallels to classic Economic theory can also be made. With regard to Expected Utility 
theory, the overall tendency to pick gamble six is completely rational. As stated in this theory, 
subjects seek to maximize their utility given the circumstances (Perloff, 2014). Gamble six has 
the highest expected value out of all the gambles and should accordingly be the clear choice for 
a utility maximizing individual. 
 
 
6.2 Limits of the Research 
Moreover, it is important to point out the limits of this research and the weakness of the 
experimental design. We want to underline that the purpose of this experiment was to provide 
a simplification of reality, used to investigate characteristics of behavior, not providing a 
complete picture of reality. Eckel and Grossman (2002) have used this experimental design to 
examine differences in gender regarding risk attitude. It might be justified to criticize the 
method used in this research. It can be enhanced for investigating if information load affect risk 
preferences. When considering the comments from participants, the payoff might have been a 
too small amount of money to trigger risk behavior. Many of the participants commented that 
they chose the riskiest gamble since they could not lose anything and that the gamble that 
provided the largest high payoff was the only gamble they would potentially profit from. As 
reported by Holt and Laury, 2002, the degree of risk aversion might be increased if the financial 
incentive is scaled up. 
Further, the experiment was conducted with varied groups of undergraduate students, 
where the largest parts of participants were currently studying courses in Economics or 
Business. The risk elicitation was in relation to financial risk, and students in Economics and 
Business might have more experience managing and be more familiar with these types of risks 
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since over time, people can acquire skills and develop strategies for decision-making in a 
specific domain (Gonzalez, Lerch, and Lebiere, 2003).  A data collection consisting of students 
with education in Economics and Business might benefit the students in this experiment, 
making them less sensitive to changes in risk attitude when varying information load. An 
interesting enhancement of this experiment could, therefore, be to improve the data collection, 
including more people in the research to examine if information load influences risk preferences 
depending on the level of education, age, or gender.  
Moreover, one could investigate if the amount of information does affect risk preferences 
in other risky contexts, for example, risk related to health or social life. Further, the 
experimental design does only allow categorizing the subjects as “risk averse,” “risk neutral,” 
or “risk-seeking,” but the method is silent about variation within the categories (Charness, 
Gneezy, and Imas, 2012). It is plausible that information load affect subjects in different ways, 
such as making a slight risk-averse person more risk-averse and an extremely risk-seeking 
person less risk seeking. It should also be noted that the absence of a significant effect of 
increased information load on risk-seeking behavior, could be a consequence of the ceiling 
effect discussed in the Method. As the Eckel and Grossman-table does not introduce any 
gambles beyond gamble number six, it is impossible to elicit if participants would choose an 
even riskier gamble, given the opportunity. Although, our result does not support our 
hypothesis, thus, we cannot make any statement about if information load affect risk attitude. 
An experimental design that measures risk preferences on an interval scale could be appropriate 
for the purpose to investigate whether information load change degree of risk preference. 
Moreover, the level of stress was self-reported and was a hindsight estimate (Christensen-
Szalanski and Willham, 1991), which might not reveal the exact causal relationship between 
information load and stress level (Spector, 1994).  
It may be justifiable to conduct an experiment where the informational part and evaluation 
for the risk preferences of participants are independent and where participants are presented 
with another type of information, such as visual or auditory. In this experiment, all the 
information was written in English, which might affect the accuracy of communication and the 
task performance in different ways. A large part of the participants were non-native speakers of 
English, which might have impacted to which extent participants understood the instructions, 
making the task appear more complicated than would have been if the task was described in 
their native language. There are individual differences between participants that influence their 
performance, such as reading ability, reading speed, reaction time, the difference in reading 
comprehension and stress tolerance. Instead of questionnaires or presenting participants with 
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gambles to examine their level of risk-taking, computer simulation can be used to present visual 
information. An alternative for representing information in symbolic form to examine people’s 
risk preferences could be for instance, The Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART) presented by 
Lejuez et al. (2002), which uses visual information for risk elicitation.  
 
 
6.3 Future Research  
Future research is needed in this area to determine whether the amount of information given a 
time constraint affect people’s risk preferences. First, we suggest that the experimental design 
has to be enhanced and made more robust to control for individual differences, the accuracy of 
communicating how the task will be performed and elicitation of risk preferences. It might be 
more justifiable to attempt an experiment that accounts for disabilities that can affect task 
performance. Second, the experimental design in this research only allows the researchers to 
test for an effect of information in static decision-making. Another approach will be to 
investigate if the increased amount of information affects people’s risk attitude in the context 
of dynamic decision-making. Investigation in an dynamic environment might capture the effect 
of mechanisms that can enhance the decision-making process over time. However, the 
challenge of this investigation would be to construct an experimental design that can account 
for the acquisition of skills and still impose time pressure in a dynamic environment. Third, 
further investigation of how time pressure affects the processing of information and emotions 
that can affect risk preferences would be an essential part to increase understanding of how 
people make judgments under risk and uncertainty. Therefore, we suggest further research were 
the outcome can be described in terms of gains as well as losses to account for effects of framing 
and anchoring. 
 
 
7 Summary 
 
We set out to find how information affects risky decision-making under time pressure. Through 
important research on the subject, we hypothesized that more information under a time 
constraint would cause subjects to appear more risk-seeking. We tested this through an 
experiment where participants were tasked to calculate an important piece of information that 
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was to be used in calculating the payoff in six potential gambles where they had to choose one 
according to their risk preference. The amount of information provided varied between the 
control and treatment group and the time constraint was fixed. We find no significant effect on 
stress between groups and no significant effect on which gamble subjects choose. However, the 
results of this research cannot be taken as conclusive evidence of lack of a information load 
effect. Several weaknesses were found in the experimental design that can have affected the 
outcome. 
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9 Appendices 
 
 
Appendix A - The “Eckel and Grossman-Table”  
 
 
Choice 
(50/50 Gamble) 
Low 
payoff 
High 
payoff 
Expected 
return 
Standard 
deviation 
Implied CRRA 
range 
Gamble 1 28 28 28 0 3.46 < r 
Gamble 2 24 36 30 6 1.16 < r < 3.46 
Gamble 3 20 44 32 12 0.71 < r < 1.16 
Gamble 4 16 52 34 18 0.50 < r < 0.71 
Gamble 5 12 60 36 24 0 < r < 0.50 
Gamble 6 2 70 36 34 R < 0 
(Charness, Gneezy & Imas, 2012). 
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Appendix B - The Experiment (Control Group) 
 
Instructions 
 
Do not skip ahead in the papers. Wait for the instructions by the experiment supervisor. 
 
Thank you for participating in our experiment. This experiment may last up to 10 minutes.  
 
In this experiment you will have the opportunity to earn some money. Therefore, it is in your interest to 
pay attention to the instructions and make careful choices.  
 
Anonymity:  
Should you agree to participate your name will only be connected to your calculation in part 1 of the 
experiment in order for you to be selected for payment. For the purpose of our research, your answers 
and the information you provide are kept completely anonymous.  
 
Some Rules:  
Please switch your cell phone to silent-mode (no vibration) and put away anything else that you have 
brought with you. Please do not talk to other participants during the experiment or attempt to look at the 
questionnaires of other participants. Do not skip ahead in the papers. Wait for instructions by the 
experiment supervisor.  
 
If you have any questions at this point, or at any later point during the experiment, please simply raise 
your hand. A member of the research team will answer it. 
 
Anyone violating these rules may be excluded from the experiment. In this case you will forfeit any 
earnings.  
 
Structure of the experiment:  
Please find more instructions for the task on the next page.  
 
Please take your time to read all instructions carefully before making any decisions! 
 
Now, please turn to the next page when you have read the information above carefully. 
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Task description  
 
Do not turn to the next page before instructed.  
 
The time will start when you are instructed to turn the page, then you will then have two minutes 45 
seconds to solve the test. You are allowed a pencil and if necessary take notes in the right side of the 
sheet. No calculator is allowed. The research team will tell you when the time has passed. You are not 
allowed to either calculate or write anything more when the time has passed, and please wait for further 
instructions from the research team. Make sure to allocate your time wisely in order to finish both part 
1 and 2 within the time constraint (two minutes 45 seconds).  
 
The next page (experiment) will be divided into two parts:  
 
In part 1, you will be provided instructions and a 3x3 table. Your task in this part is to follow the 
instructions and calculate a number X. 
 
Example of a table: 
 A B C 
Row 1       
 2   Cell B2   
3       
 
 
In part 2, you will see a list of 6 gambles, which all have different payoffs (payoff = the amount that 
you can potentially win), denominated in SEK. There is a low payoff written out and a high payoff that 
will be a function of X which you will have to calculate. Your task in this part is to plug in the value of 
X in the mathematical function to calculate the high payoff for each gamble. After you have calculated 
the payoff for each gamble, choose the gamble that reflects your risk preference. (1-6). 
 
The payout rules 
 
After the experiment is over, the research team will randomly select 10 participants to participate in a 
gamble. In order to be eligible, you have to calculate the correct value for X in part 1 and choose a 
gamble in part 2. If you are selected to play the gamble you will have the opportunity to win either the 
low pay-off or the high pay-off of the gamble you chose in part 2. 
 
In the gamble, you can only win money i.e. you will not lose anything. To determine if the selected 
participants will receive either the low payoff or the high payoff of the gamble they chose in part 2 of 
the experiment, the research team will toss a coin (head or tail). Thus, the chance of winning the low 
payoff or the high payoff is equally possible (50/50).  
 
 
Please do not turn to the next page before instructed, otherwise you will be excluded from the 
experiment and it will not be possible for you to be selected for the gamble.  
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PART 1 
Please follow the instructions below and calculate X.  
 
Instructions: 
Look at the table. Look at the top row of the table. Sum all the numbers in that row. Divide that sum by 
3, and find that number in the table. Look at the number in the cell below. You now have the number 
X! 
 
Table:    
 A B C 
1 2 13 15 
2 P 10   
3 6 2 25+25 
    
 
 
Please state your answer here: X = 
 
 
 
Please continue to part 2. 
 
PART 2 
  
Now, calculate the high payoff for each gamble and then choose the gamble you prefer. 
Use the number X that you calculated in part 1. 
Gamble 
number   
Low payoff 
(SEK) 
High 
payoff (SEK)   
1  30 20+X =  
2  25 48-X =   
3  20 30+X+6 =   
4  15 64-X =   
5  10 
12+60-X 
=   
6  5 80-X =   
      
      
 
Please, state the number of the gamble that you want to play here:  _____ (1-6)  
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General questions 
What is your gender? 
Male Female Prefer not to answer      
What is your age? _____________ 
What are you currently studying: program/course? 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Please indicate your level of stress when taking the test. Please answer on a scale from 1 to 7, 
where 1 means “I did not experience any stress at all when taking the test” and 7 meaning “I 
did experience a lot of stress when taking the test”. 
No stress      Much stress 
     1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Investing 10% of your annual income in a moderate growth mutual fund. ______(1-7) 
2. Not returning a wallet you found that contains 1500 SEK.  ______(1-7) 
3. Walking home alone at night in an unsafe area of town.  ______(1-7) 
4. Choosing a career that you truly enjoy over a more secure one.  ______(1-7) 
5. Passing off somebody else’s work as your own.   ______(1-7) 
6. Bungee jumping off a tall bridge.    ______(1-7) 
We would like to understand how you made your decision about the gamble in the experiment. 
Please, briefly tell us why you chose the gamble in the way you did. 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________ 
For each of the following statements, please indicate the likelihood that you would engage in the 
described activity or behavior if you were to find yourself in that situation.  Provide a rating from 
Extremely Unlikely to Extremely Likely, using the following scale: 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 1  2  3  4  5    6     7 
Extremely          Moderately            Somewhat  Not Sure             Somewhat          Moderately          Extremely 
 Unlikely  Unlikely                 Unlikely      Likely                  Likely                Likely 
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Appendix C - The Experiment (Treatment Group) 
 
Instructions 
 
Do not skip ahead in the papers. Wait for the instructions by the experiment supervisor. 
 
Thank you for participating in our experiment. This experiment may last up to 10 minutes.  
 
In this experiment you will have the opportunity to earn some money. Therefore, it is in your interest to 
pay attention to the instructions and make careful choices.  
 
Anonymity:  
Should you agree to participate your name will only be connected to your calculation in part 1 of the 
experiment in order for you to be selected for payment. For the purpose of our research, your answers 
and the information you provide are kept completely anonymous.  
 
Some Rules:  
Please switch your cell phone to silent-mode (no vibration) and put away anything else that you have 
brought with you. Please do not talk to other participants during the experiment or attempt to look at the 
questionnaires of other participants. Do not skip ahead in the papers. Wait for instructions by the 
experiment supervisor.  
 
If you have any questions at this point, or at any later point during the experiment, please simply raise 
your hand. A member of the research team will answer it. 
 
Anyone violating these rules may be excluded from the experiment. In this case you will forfeit any 
earnings.  
 
Structure of the experiment:  
Please find more instructions for the task on the next page.  
 
Please take your time to read all instructions carefully before making any decisions! 
 
Now, please turn to the next page when you have read the information above carefully. 
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Task description  
 
Do not turn to the next page before instructed.  
 
The time will start when you are instructed to turn the page, then you will then have two minutes 45 
seconds to solve the test. You are allowed a pencil and if necessary take notes in the right side of the 
sheet. No calculator is allowed. The research team will tell you when the time has passed. You are not 
allowed to either calculate or write anything more when the time has passed, and please wait for further 
instructions from the research team. Make sure to allocate your time wisely in order to finish both part 
1 and 2 within the time constraint (two minutes 45 seconds).  
 
The next page (experiment) will be divided into two parts:  
 
In part 1, you will be provided instructions and a 3x3 table. Your task in this part is to follow the 
instructions and calculate a number X. 
 
Example of a table: 
 A B C 
Row 1       
 2    Cell B2   
3       
 
 
In part 2, you will see a list of 6 gambles, which all have different payoffs (payoff = the amount that 
you can potentially win), denominated in SEK. There is a low payoff written out and a high payoff that 
will be a function of X which you will have to calculate. Your task in this part is to plug in the value of 
X in the mathematical function to calculate the high payoff for each gamble. After you have calculated 
the payoff for each gamble, choose the gamble that reflects your risk preference. (1-6). 
 
The payout rules 
 
After the experiment is over, the research team will randomly select 10 participants to participate in a 
gamble. In order to be eligible, you have to calculate the correct value for X in part 1 and choose a 
gamble in part 2. If you are selected to play the gamble you will have the opportunity to win either the 
low pay-off or the high pay-off of the gamble you chose in part 2. 
 
In the gamble, you can only win money i.e. you will not lose anything. To determine if the selected 
participants will receive either the low payoff or the high payoff of the gamble they chose in part 2 of 
the experiment, the research team will toss a coin (head or tail). Thus, the chance of winning the low 
payoff or the high payoff is equally possible (50/50).  
 
 
Please do not turn to the next page before instructed, otherwise you will be excluded from the 
experiment and it will not be possible for you to be selected for the gamble.  
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PART 1 
Please follow the instructions below and calculate X.  
 
Instructions: 
Look at the table. Look at the top row of the table. Sum all the numbers in that row. Divide that sum by 
3, and find that number in the table. Look at the number in the cell below. Multiply that number by 5. 
Take that value and add to the value of cell C3. Divide the number you calculated in the last step by the 
number in the orange cell. You now have the number X! 
 
Table:    
 A B C 
1 2 13 15 
2 P 10   
3 6 2 25+25 
    
 
 
Please state your answer here: X = 
 
 
 
Please continue to part 2. 
 
PART 2 
  
Now, calculate the high payoff for each gamble and then choose the gamble you prefer. 
Use the number X that you calculated in part 1. 
Gamble 
number   
Low payoff 
(SEK) 
High payoff 
(SEK)   
1  30 20+X =  
2  25 48-X =   
3  20 30+X+6 =   
4  15 64-X =   
5  10 12+60-X =   
6  5 80-X =   
      
      
 
Please, state the number of the gamble that you want to play here:  _____ (1-6)  
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General questions 
What is your gender? 
Male Female Prefer not to answer      
What is your age? _____________ 
What are you currently studying: program/course? 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Please indicate your level of stress when taking the test. Please answer on a scale from 1 to 7, 
where 1 means “I did not experience any stress at all when taking the test” and 7 meaning “I 
did experience a lot of stress when taking the test”. 
No stress      Much stress 
     1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
 
 
 
 
1. Investing 10% of your annual income in a moderate growth mutual fund. ______(1-7) 
2. Not returning a wallet you found that contains 1500 SEK.  ______(1-7) 
3. Walking home alone at night in an unsafe area of town.  ______(1-7) 
4. Choosing a career that you truly enjoy over a more secure one.  ______(1-7) 
5. Passing off somebody else’s work as your own.   ______(1-7) 
6. Bungee jumping off a tall bridge.    ______(1-7) 
We would like to understand how you made your decision about the gamble in the experiment. 
Please, briefly tell us why you chose the gamble in the way you did. 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
For each of the following statements, please indicate the likelihood that you would engage in the 
described activity or behavior if you were to find yourself in that situation.  Provide a rating from 
Extremely Unlikely to Extremely Likely, using the following scale: 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 1  2  3  4  5    6     7 
Extremely          Moderately            Somewhat  Not Sure             Somewhat          Moderately          Extremely 
 Unlikely  Unlikely                 Unlikely      Likely                  Likely                Likely 
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Appendix D – DOSPERT-Scale 
The DOSPERT Scale (from Blais, & Weber, 2006) 
 
To generate a short version of the scale with items that would be interpretable by a wider range 
of respondents in different cultures, the 40 items of the original scale (Weber, Blais, & Betz, 2002) were 
revised and eight new items were added.  The response scale was modified slightly by increasing the 
number of scale points from 5 to 7 and by labeling all of them (i.e., instead of just the two endpoints) in 
an effort to increase the psychometric quality of the scale (Visser, Krosnick, & Lavrakas, 2000).  The 
new set of 48 items was administered to a group of 372 North Americans, and this group was randomly 
split into two sub-groups.  Data from one sub-group were analyzed in an exploratory manner and 
resulted in a 30-item model that was tested through confirmatory factor analyses using the other sub-
group (Blais, & Weber, 2005).  
 
 The risk-taking responses of the 30-item version of the DOSPERT Scale evaluate 
behavioral intentions -or the likelihood with which respondents might engage in risky 
activities/behaviors- originating from five domains of life (i.e., ethical, financial, health/safety, social, 
and recreational risks), using a 7-point rating scale ranging from 1 (Extremely Unlikely) to 7 (Extremely 
Likely).1  Sample items include “Having an affair with a married man/woman” (Ethical), “Investing 
10% of your annual income in a new business venture” (Financial), “Engaging in unprotected sex” 
(Health/Safety), “Disagreeing with an authority figure on a major issue” (Social), and “Taking a 
weekend sky-diving class” (Recreational).  Item ratings are added across all items of a given subscale 
to obtain subscale scores.  Higher scores indicate greater risk taking in the domain of the subscale.   
 
 The risk-perception responses evaluate the respondents’ gut level assessment of how risky each 
activity/behavior is, using a 7-point rating scale ranging from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (Extremely Risky).  Item 
ratings are added across all items of a given subscale to obtain subscale scores, with higher scores 
suggesting perceptions of greater risk in the domain of the subscale.  
 
The internal consistency reliability estimates associated with the original 48-item 
English risk-taking scores ranged from .70 to .84 (mean α = .78), and those associated with 
the risk-perception scores, from .70 to .81 (mean α = .77), as reported by Weber, et al. (2002).  
The authors also found moderate test-retest reliability estimates (albeit for an earlier version 
of the instrument) and provided evidence for the factorial and convergent/discriminant 
validity of the scores with respect to constructs such as sensation seeking, dispositional risk 
taking, intolerance for ambiguity, and social desirability.  Construct validity was also assessed 
via correlations with the results of a risky gambling task as well as with tests of gender 
differences.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Domain-Specific Risk-Taking (Adult) Scale – Risk Taking 
 
                                                          
1 The six financial items can be split into three gambling and three investment items for further decomposition of 
the construct.  Conversely, all 30 items can be added up, yielding an overall scale score, for a broader assessment 
of the risk-taking constructs.  These models were also tested through confirmatory factor analyses (Blais, & 
Weber, 2005, 2006). 
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For each of the following statements, please indicate the likelihood that you would engage in 
the described activity or behavior if you were to find yourself in that situation.  Provide a 
rating from Extremely Unlikely to Extremely Likely, using the following scale: 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 1 2 3 4 5  6  7 
Extremely          Moderately            Somewhat  Not Sure             Somewhat          Moderately          Extremely 
 Unlikely     Unlikely       Unlikely       Likely        Likely         Likely 
 
 
1. Admitting that your tastes are different from those of a friend. (S) 
   
2. Going camping in the wilderness. (R)   
     
3. Betting a day’s income at the horse races. (F/G)   
               
4. Investing 10% of your annual income in a moderate growth diversified fund. (F/I)
   
5. Drinking heavily at a social function. (H/S)   
    
6. Taking some questionable deductions on your income tax return. (E)  
   
7. Disagreeing with an authority figure on a major issue. (S)  
   
8. Betting a day’s income at a high-stake poker game. (F/G)   
    
9. Having an affair with a married man/woman. (E)   
   
10. Passing off somebody else’s work as your own. (E)  
     
11. Going down a ski run that is beyond your ability. (R)  
    
12. Investing 5% of your annual income in a very speculative stock. (F/I) 
   
13. Going whitewater rafting at high water in the spring. (R)   
   
14. Betting a day’s income on the outcome of a sporting event  (F/G) 
    
15. Engaging in unprotected sex. (H/S)    
    
16. Revealing a friend’s secret to someone else. (E)   
    
17. Driving a car without wearing a seat belt. (H/S)    
    
18. Investing 10% of your annual income in a new business venture. (F/I)  
   
19. Taking a skydiving class. (R)     
     
20. Riding a motorcycle without a helmet. (H/S)    
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21. Choosing a career that you truly enjoy over a more secure one. (S) 
   
22. Speaking your mind about an unpopular issue in a meeting at work. (S) 
  
23. Sunbathing without sunscreen. (H/S)   
     
24. Bungee jumping off a tall bridge.  (R)   
     
25. Piloting a small plane. (R)    
     
26. Walking home alone at night in an unsafe area of town. (H/S)  
   
27. Moving to a city far away from your extended family. (S)  
    
28. Starting a new career in your mid-thirties. (S)   
    
29. Leaving your young children alone at home while running an errand. (E)  
  
30. Not returning a wallet you found that contains $200. (E)   
   
 
Note.  E = Ethical, F = Financial, H/S = Health/Safety, R = Recreational, and S = Social. 
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Domain-Specific Risk-Taking (Adult) Scale – Risk Perceptions 
 
People often see some risk in situations that contain uncertainty about what the outcome or 
consequences will be and for which there is the possibility of negative consequences.  However, 
riskiness is a very personal and intuitive notion, and we are interested in your gut level assessment of 
how risky each situation or behavior is. 
 
For each of the following statements, please indicate how risky you perceive each situation.  
Provide a rating from Not at all Risky to Extremely Risky, using the following scale: 
 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all               Slightly              Somewhat           Moderately              Risky            Very                Extremely 
  Risky      Risky         Risky            Risky          Risky         Risky 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Domain-Specific Risk-Taking (Adult) Scale – Expected Benefits 
 
For each of the following statements, please indicate the benefits you would obtain from each 
situation.  Provide a rating from 1 to 7, using the following scale: 
 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
No benefit        Moderate                        Great 
  At all        Benefits        Benefits 
 
 
 
 
 
Reference: 
Blais, A-R. and E. U. Weber. 2006. “A Domain-specific Risk-taking (DOSPERT) Scale for 
Adult Populations.” Judgment and Decision Making, 1, 33-47. 
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Appendix E – Robustness Check 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Gamble Gamble Gamble Gamble Gamble Gamble 
        
Control/Treatment 0.251  0.250 0.264 0.254 - 
  (0.71)  (0.70) (0.74) (0.71)  
        
If answered correctly only  0.181 - - - 0.218 
   (0.45)    (0.53) 
        
Stress level   0.004 -0.166 -0.017 -0.019 
    (0.04) (-0.14) (-0.14) (-0.15) 
        
Age    0.027 0.027 0.029 
     (0.83) (0.83) (0.53) 
        
Gender     -0.107 -0.054 
      (-0.27) (-0.13) 
       
t-value in parentesis ( * = p < 0.1  ** = p < 0.05)     
 
 
